TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

APPRIDIX IV

10

ANNEX C

LOGISTICS

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3828 NAZI WAR CRIMES BISCLOSURE ACTUATE 2007

CLASCIFICATION IF IEW DIVISION

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### SECURITY INFORMATION

#### LOGISTICS

- TASK ORGANIZATION. See Appendix I, Annex C.
- GENERAL SITUATION.
  - a. Enemy Situation. See Appendix II, Annex C.
  - b. Friendly Forces. See Para. 1b, 2, and 3, Annex C.
  - c. Basic Assumptions.
  - (1) The support forces for this operation will be divided into two major support commands with the North Support Command a Yugoslavian effort and the South Support Command a combined US/UK effort. These support commands will not exercise any operational control over any forces within the limits of Albania.
  - (2) The support commands will be organized along parallel lines. The North Support Command will have fewer support problems than the South Sector Command due to the fact it can be mounted from the sponsoring country. The forces to be mounted and the equipment required are relatively the same. For the above reasons only the more complex South Support Command will be spelled out in detail and the results can be applied to the North Support Command.

#### (3) Forces:

Mode of Transportation						
Forces	Sise	AIR	SRY	LAND	Supported by	
Northern Field Command	: 1321(b)	250	250	821	North Support Command	
Central Field	- •				2605 North Support	
Area	5211(c&d	2800	2411		2606 South Support	
Southern Field						
Command	2245(b)	250(a)	1068	827	South Support Command	
Reserve	2000(6)	2000(a)	***	****	1000 North Support Command	
		• -			1000 South Support Command	
Internal Resis-					5000 North Support Command	
tance Force	10,000(0)	-	-	***	5000 South Support Command	
	20,677	5300	3729	1648		

(4) Support tennage will be moved; 50% by sea; 30% by air; 20% by land.

(a)	sa reperon			
(b)	Page 3. Avan T	(Reserve	rounded to	2000)

(a) Page 2, App I, plus (d) TOP SECRET

Page 4, App I

(e) Par. 3b., Annex C

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(5) Support

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(5) Support Facilities: The following support facilities will be developed within each support dommand area.
(Dispersion is essential).

(a) Main Support Rase As desired Tripoli

(b) Staging & loading areas

- (i) Marine 2 or 5 Yugoslavia 2 or 5 Greece, and/or Italy, or Yugoslavia
- (ii) Air Strips 5 or 10 Yugoslavia 5 or 10 Greece, and/or
- (iii) Ground As desired " As desired Greece
- (c) Training Areas As desired " 5 or more Greece
- (6) The required sea and air lift capabilities will be developed.
- (7) Tonnage requirements are based on the following rates:

88 tons/1000 on initial issue, less rations.
7.8 tons/1000 on resupply, less rations.
21,000 troops will receive initial issue. (nearest 1000)
21,000 troops will receive resupply. (nearest 1000)

(8) A detailed list of items will be developed when the composition of the task forces is finalized and a survey made of the equipment new on hand to support this effort.

#### S. MISSION.

- a. The North Support Command will:
  - (1) Provide logistical support for all forces mounted out of its support area.
  - (2) Provide arms and assumition to forces generated within Albania.
  - (5) Be prepared to assist the South Support Command as required.
- b. The South Support Command will:
  - (1) Provide logistical support for all forces mounted out of its support area.
  - (2) Provide arms and ammunition to forces generated within Albania.

(5) Be

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(5) Be prepared to assist the North Support Command as required.

#### 4. SUPPLY.

- a. South Support Command
  - (1) Operational supplies will be assembled at the major support base at Tripoli. These stocks will be prepared for shipment by air, sea, or land. Prior to target date these supplies will be infiltrated into the forward staging and leading areas. Based on operations as planned, material will be readied as follows:
    - (a) Air 140 tons
    - (b) Sea 240 tons
    - (c) Land- 94 tens
  - (2) If operations extend beyond the scope as visualized by this operation, the South Support Command is authorised to secure additional material from the major support base at Tripoli.
  - (5) Rations
    - (a) Personnel introduced into action will be issued two assault rations.
    - (b) 420,000 combat rations will be stored at Tripoli.
    - (c) 168,000 assault rations will be stored at forward maritime bases.
    - (d) 42,000 assault rations will be stored at forward air strips.
- b. North Support Command Same as South Support Command except that bases will all be located in Yugoslavia.
- 5. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION.
  - a. Main hospital for South Support Command will be located at Tripoli. Hospital facilities for North Support Command will be located in Yugoslavia.

b. Emergency

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- b. Emergency facilities will be located at forward loading and and staging areas.
- o. See and land lift will be utilised to evaquate wounded. Airlift will be provided as sooners practicable.

#### 6. TRANSPORTATION.

- a. South Support Command
  - (1) Air. To meet the airlift requirements to support the operations 64-647 or planes of similar capacity will be needed. These planes will be assembled at Tripoli. A day or two prior to the target date these planes will be flown to the forward staging and loading areas. In these areas they will be loaded and flown into the target area. The number of planes required to support this operation can be reduced if the initial effort can be time-phased.
  - (2) Sea. The sealift requirements can be more readily met.
    Total requirements are 47 LCA and 4 LCU or crafts with
    similar sea-lift capacity. These craft will be assembled
    at the various loading and staging areas, combat loaded
    and dispatched to target areas.
  - (5) Land. The limited road facilities available in Albania proclude the use of a large number of motor vehicles. A very limited number of light vehicles to be used by various headquarters will be provided if required. Native transportation as required to meet the operations will be impressed into service.
  - (4) Movement control for land and sea forces will be exercised by Marine and Ground Support Command. Movement control of air-lift will be cleared through Support Command South.
    - (5) Movement Table

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#### (5) Movement Table

		LOAD			Lift		
Type Sup	ply	Personnel		Time Phase	Requirements	Remarks	
Initial .	Air	1400	53	D-Day	64-C47	100 ten reserve on	
	Sea	2274	86	D-Day	47-LOA	scalift will not	
					4-LOU	be unloaded until	
•	Land	827	38	D-Day	Hone .	beachhead is secure.	
Resupply	#1						
	<u>A</u> Îr	750	42	D/A	44-C47	Remainder of C&T to	
	_		***	<b>A</b> -	•	be in reserve. Re-	
	Sea	*	54	141	As req-	supply, Evacuation	
					uired	of wounded. Avail-	
<b></b>	Land	ensk.	28	n/1	_	able for other operation.	
•	LAKENA	<del></del>	69	ph.r	_	abor # # mare	
Resupply	#2					·	
	Air	500	45	D/-2	35-C47		
•	Sea	•	•	•	As required	l	
	Land	***	28	D/2	· <del>-</del>		

- b. North Support Command (Transportation requirements are 78-C47, 32ICA-) 2ICU.)
- e. Air liaison Group of both commands (12 light aircraft each) will provide a highly flexible reserve transportation for commo, personnel, and material.

#### 7. HEADQUARTERS.

- a. North Support Command Yugoslavia.
- b. South Support Command Greece.

### ANNEXA

CIA OUTLINE PLAN

FOR PARAMILITARY ACTION

IN THE EVENT OF ALBANIAN COUP

INSTIGATED UNILATERALLY

BY YUGOSLAVIA

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Headquarters CIA February 1953

Operation	Plan	BG	 

1. GENERAL SITUATION. There is a possibility that YUGOSLAVIA may unilaterally initiate a coup d'etat in ALBANIA at any time, with the intent of making ALBANIA a Yugoslav satellite. CIA operations in ALBANIA continue as provided in present BGFIEND planning, includin normal expansion visualized thereunder. In the event of such a unilateral coup, CIA must be prepared to take appropriate action. This plan sets forth action to be taken under the following assumptions.

#### 2. ASSUMPTIONS.

a. Basic. Decision has been made just prior to issuance of this plan that expansion of US - British covert operations in ALBANIA solely in anticipation of a Yugoslav unilateral coup is not warranted, but that US and UK should be prepared at any time with all available means to prevent ALBANIA from becoming a Yugoslav satellite through a unilaterally-inspired Yugoslav coup. (Thus, BGFIEND assets plus any additional assets created to carry out any other new plans in ALBANIA (such as preparation for a multilateral coup) will be available.)

#### b. Specific.

- (1) YUGOSLAVIA initiated a unilateral coup in ALBANIA on K-Day.
- (2) By X / 2 it is apparent that the success of the coup is dependent upon the commitment of US and UK clandestine service assets in support of the coup.
- (3) On X / 2, in accordance with plans prepared in advance, US and UK reached a mutual agreement with YUGOSLAVIA that:
  - (a) ALBANIA under the new coup regime would be free and independent.
  - (b) US, UK, and YUGOSLAVIA will simultaneously recognize the new regime when success is assured.

(c) US and UK

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- (c) US and UK will assist YUGOSLAVIA with all available covert means in pushing the coup to a successful completion.
- 3. MISSION. CIA, in coordination with Pritish and Yugoslav clandestine services, renders all possible covert assistance to assure success of the coup. As a corollary, CIA undertakes all possible covert action to guard against liberated ALBANIA's becoming a Yugoslav satellite.
- 4. Under supervision of Chief, SE Division:
  - a. Senior Representative, ATHEMS, prepares at the earliest practicable date, and maintains up-to-date lists of all CIA assets which should be utilized to assist in the success of a unilateral Yugoslav-inspired coup, together with a flexible plan for possible employment. This list and plan to be periodically cleared with and approved by CIA Headquarters. He also prepares detailed plans for employment of such limited assets as may be available to guard against liberated ALBANIA becoming a Yugo-slav satellite. These plans are periodically reviewed and approved by Headquarters CIA. In the absence of other over-riding emergencies, virtually all CIA assets aimed at targets in ALBANIA should be considered available for the purposes set forth above.
  - b. The Senior Representative, BELGRADE, is kept informed as to the provisions of the above plans. Upon notification by Chief, SE, that agreements referred to in paragraph 2 b above have been effected, the Senior Representative, ATHENS, through the Senior Representative, BELGRADE, contacts Yugoslavian clandestine services and directs employment of CIA assets in support of the coup, coordinating as necessary and appropriate with Yugoslavian clandestine service. He concerts action with British representatives ATHENS.
- 5. a. Plans to assist the coup (paragraph 3 above) should contemplate rapid commitment of the following CIA assets:
  - (1) Immediate establishment of effective liaison with field headquarters of the coup to assure coordination in employment of CIA assets and assure all possible US influence on coup headquarters' decisions.
  - (2) Arms and equipment on hand in GREECE and in TRIPOLI as required.
  - (3) Surfacing, expansion, and coordinated employment of internal PH assets in ALBANIA.

(h) Dispatch

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- (a) Die of Gelected Will a participate in the
- (5) Employment of all PP theme in support of the coup with emphasis on a free and independent ALBANIA under the new coup regime.
- b. Plans to guard against liberated ALBANIA becoming a Yugoslav satellite (paragraph 3 above) should include the following measures:
  - (1) Maintaining best possible intelligence as to Yugoslav and coup leaders intentions concerning the independence of ALBANIA.
  - (2) Based on (1) above, all practical measures to discredit or eliminate leaders endeavoring to make the new government a Yugoslav satellite.